General Rikarute 5.gen.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Tokyo was informed on October 16, 1941 that the Secretary of State was advising temporary postponement of activities in regard to the matter of payment for petroleum because the United States was giving due consideration to the changes taking place in the Japanese government. As soon as Japan's political situation had crystallized the United States would decide immediately upon a course of action.[717] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

227. Major Yano Arranges Anti-American Espionage

The Japanese officials stationed in the United States were planning an increase in anti-American espionage activities. After receiving instructions from the General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo, Major Yano, on October 10, 1941, was preparing to leave Washington with Japanese code books for an official trip to Mexico.[718]

228. Tokyo Releases the Schedules of Evacuation Vessels to Washington

On October 12, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Ambassador Nomura the schedule of the evacuation ships. The Tatsuta Maru would arrive at Honolulu on October 24, 1941 and at San Francisco on October 30, 1941 leaving there on November 2, 1941.

The Nitsuta Maru would arrive at Vancouver on October 31, 1941 and at Seattle on November 1, 1941 leaving Seattle on November 3; while the Taiyo Maru would dock at Honolulu from November 1 to 4.[719]

229. Consul Muto Estimates Number of Potential Evacuees

Consul Muto in San Francisco, who appeared to be in charge of the evacuation, informed Tokyo on October 14, 1941 that approximately 130 first class passengers and 64 second class passengers from New York and Chicago were to be evacuated on the Hikawa Maru and on the Tatsuta Maru. He advised that the other 127 persons resident in Chicago who wished to return home should advise the New York Consular office. Under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles office were 38 first class passengers, 25 second class passengers and 200 third class passengers who wished to return home. The number of those taken on at Los Angeles could, should the situation warrant, be increased by approximately 250.[720] After the evacuation had been made, the Consul hoped that others who remained and who might be anxious to return to Japan would inform the Consular Office.[721]

230. Japan Requests Permits for Japanese to Re-enter the United States

At this time Tokyo was requesting that Japanese who re-entry permits had expired or who had left wives and children in the United States and wished to return be granted re-entry permits. On October 13, 1941 the Foreign Minister requested that the State Department's reply in regard to this matter be sent by noon of October 14, 1941, and that in case the American answer should be further delayed Ambassador Nomura's opinion concerning the matter be sent.[722]

When Ambassador Nomura referred this question to the State Department he was informed that the matter had considerable bearing upon the question of permitting American citizens in Japan to leave the country. Telephone reports had revealed that American persons had found it necessary to secure nine different permits before they were allowed to leave Japan.

[717] III, 471.
[718] III, 472.
[719] III, 473.
[720] III, 474.
[721] III, 475.
[722] III, 476-477.

[154]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Consequently, there were many who were not able to board steamers for home. The State Department declared that until this matter had been discussed with competent authorities, it would have to postpone further reply. Ambassador Nomura at this point inquired of Tokyo as to whether any restrictions were being placed on American citizens who were endeavoring to leave the country. He asked that the departing Americans be delayed as little as possible so that their arrangements to board steamers for home could be facilitated.[723]

In regard to the evacuation of American citizens from Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda on October 15, 1941 replied that Japanese regulations regarding the evacuation of foreigners applied to all non-Japanese and not to Americans only. At the suggestion of Ambassador Nomura, Japanese authorities were considering the elimination of as much red tape as possible at this time when Americans were desirous of returning home. Many Americans would, however, require two or three weeks to make preparations for leaving and, for this reason, would not be ready in time to sail on the ship scheduled to leave soon. This problem had nothing to do with the issuance of permits to leave the country, Foreign Minister Toyoda said, and furthermore, the American Ambassador in Tokyo should be fully cognizant of the situation.[724]

231. Japan Refuses to Recognize Yugoslavia

Japan's recognition of Croatia rather than Yugoslavia was stressed in instructions from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura on October 13, 1941. Although the interests of Yugoslavia in Japan had been taken care of by France since 1919, recently when England had presented a note that this care would devolve on the British Embassy, Japan replied that having already recognized Croatia, it did not recognize Yugoslavia, and such a representation could not be acknowledged.[725]

232. The United States Requests Fuel Oil For Its Tokyo Embassy and the Yokohama Consulate General

On October 14, 1941 the State Department requested that a permit for fuel oil for heat and hot water for its Embassy in Tokyo and the Consulate General in Yokohama be granted, since the request of the Embassy and the Consulate General had been refused. Inasmuch as the efficiency of the work of the two offices was involved, the State Department had requested Ambassador Nomura to make a telegraphic request to the Japanese government for a permit for the immediate transportation of the fuel oil. Although Ambassador Nomura realized that it was difficult to accord American diplomatic establishments special treatment, there was also the problem of the supply of bunker oil for the Tatsuta, Hikawa and Taiyo Marus to consider. Ambassador Nomura recommended that the necessary permission be granted.[726]

234. Japanese Agents Note Shipment of Light Bombers to Russia

An announcement by the United States War Department concerning the shipment of light bombers to Russia was reported to Tokyo on October 15, 1941. The planes, which appeared to be eighteen Douglas light bombers, had been purchased by the Peruvian government in Canada, but the United States had later withdrawn permit for shipment. Whether the planes would be shipped directly to Russia or would be sent Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire by way of England was not known.[728]

[723] III, 478.
[724] III, 479.
[725] III, 480.
[726] III, 481.
[728] III, 483.

[155]

235. Japan Received Documents from New York Consulate

With Mr. Aoyagi, a Japanese Consulate official from New York, who was planning to return to Japan for family reasons and was scheduled to embark on the Tatsuta Maru on October 16, 1941, Consul Morishima planned to send the ashes of Mr. Hyukichi Watanabe and one suitcase of Watanabe's personal effects.[729] He pointed out that documents from the New York Consulate had already been sent to Japan with Courier Koga, who had sailed from San Francisco on September 9, 1941.[730]

236. Japanese Secret Agents Procure a Message Sent by Secretary Hull

Tokyo was notified by its representative in Shanghai on October 16, 1941 that a Japanese secret agent had obtained a copy of Secretary Hull's reply of October 11, 1941 to the Consul General in Shanghai. The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai had appealed to Secretary Hull concerning the relaxing of the export license system and the control over exchange.[731]

237. The Japanese Ambassador to Turkey Suggests Declaration of War Against the United States On October 17, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador to Turkey, Mr. Sho Kurihara, in "submitting

his humble opinion without reflecting on the presumptiousness of it", advised that Japan should adhere to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and terminate the Japanese-American negotiations. It was his most ardent wish that Japan devote itself wholeheartedly to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia in harmony with its fixed national policy.

It was clear to the Ambassador that the Foreign Office was attempting to prevent, through Japanese-American negotiations, America's entry into the war and to effect a solution of the China Incident. Though realizing the necessity of solving the present crisis, he pointed out that little progress had been shown. Unless Japan changed its passive attitude of allowing English and American concessions and extraterritoriality, there was no hope of settling the problem. To negotiate further with America, which had oppressed Japan through the freezing order and other injustices, would result inevitably in the further encirclement of Japan, in which policy America was the ringleader.

Since America understood the absolute necessity of aiding England in order to overthrow Germany, the Japanese Ambassador declared that American participation in the war would be conditioned more by the future trend of the European war rather than by the surrender of Japanese rights in Japanese-American negotiations. Ambassador Kurihara was also disturbed because he had frequently heard remarks in Germany and Italy that Japan's attitude was that of an enemy. If Japan really had determined to fight, he believed that it would be best to end these negotiations immediately and to manifest a resolute attitude. The continuation of negotiations would not only jeopardize the settlement of the China Incident but would also permit the United States to participate in the European war.[732]

[729] III, 484.
[730] III, 485.
[731] III. 486. The Japanese dispatch containing Secretary Hull's message is not available.
[732] III, 487.

[156]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations

238. Japanese Officials Plan the Removal of Military Charts from Panama

Early in the summer of 1941 arrangements had been made by the Japanese Minister in Panama to have copies made of secret charts showing the locations of equipment, guns and other military establishments in Panama. On June 27, 1941 it had been decided not to remove the charts from Panama until such time as a safe opportunity presented itself.[733]

On August 21, however, Minister Akiyama wired that he was still encountering considerable difficulty in finding a person to whom he could entrust the diagrams for delivery, although Colonel Yamamoto, Assistant Attache to the Embassy in Washington, had taken explanatory notes of the fortification maps with him when he had passed through Panama en route to Japan during the middle of July, 1941. In spite of the fact that no definite plans had been formulated, Minister Akiyama declared that the maps would probably be moved from Panama by the end of August.[734]

Inspecting military defenses, new equipment and establishments in the Canal Zone, six members of the House of Representatives Military Committee had arrived in Panama on August 23, 1941. Minister Akiyama reported to Tokyo on August 26, 1941 that the Congressmen had inspected defenses in Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Antigua, Trinidad and Georgetown.[735]

239. Japanese Minister Asks Clarification of Duties of Subordinates

Minister Akiyama presented his credentials to the authorities of Panama on August 28, 1941 and on September 10, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed him that his present duty was to include that of Minister to Costa Rica.[736] A few weeks after his arrival in Panama, Minister Akiyama found it necessary to clarify the positions of his subordinates at that post. He proposed that Mr. Izawa be appointed as Consul since at the present time this gentleman was responsible for collecting intelligences in the Canal Zone and for making contacts with outsiders. In order to clarify matters for the Panamanian officials who did not grant diplomatic privileges to anyone below the rank of consul, and at the same time to bring about order within the office, the Japanese Minister suggested that this promotion be considered. Since Vice-Consul Hara had been engaged chiefly in Commercial dealings, Minister Akiyama suggested that he be charged only with this responsibility.[737]

Six days later on September 18, 1941 having received no reply to his proposal, Minister Akiyama again asked concerning the reassignment of duties in his office. He pointed out that to remove Mr. Jusoku Ogawa from the office at the Foreign Minister's whim would do serious harm at this critical time, since it would cause confusion in the Legation and in the intelligence organization which was running smoothly at the moment. He asked that the personnel at the Ministry remain unchanged until he had received a reply to his request.[738]

[733] See Volume II, Part B.
[734] III, 488.
[735] III, 489.
[736] III, 490-491.
[737] III, 492.
[738] III, 493.

[157]

240. Panama Investigates the Attack on the Sessa

On September 9, 1941 the American State Department announced that the 1,700 ton United States-owned former Danish steamship, Sessa, carrying food and non-military supplies to the Icelandic government at Reykjavik, had been torpedoed and sunk on August 17. The ship, which had been taken over by the United States Maritime Commission in July, was under Panama registry.[739]

Whether the attack on the ship was made in belligerent waters or not would determine the attitude of the Panama government in regard to this affair, Minister Akiyama pointed out in a dispatch to Tokyo on September 12, 1941. According to a Presidential Order that had been issued on February 19, 1941 Panama had declared itself not responsible for any risk taken by a ship of Panama registry sailing in belligerent waters of any part of the world. The shipping companies would be responsible for the damage suffered in consequence of such action.[740]

Minister Akiyama further informed Tokyo that in August the German government had demanded the withdrawal of Panamanian consuls from European nations under German occupation, and Panama, in turn, had withdrawn its consuls not only from the German occupied countries but from Germany as well.[741]

Panama had not, however, withdrawn its Minister to Germany, Francisco Villalaz Castillo, and on September 16, 1941 it had instructed Minister Castillo to protect against the torpedoing of the Montana, also under Panama registry, and the Sessa, and to demand indemnities.[742]

241. Panama's Foreign Minister Clarifies Panama's Position in Case of War

In a talk with the Panamanian Foreign Minister on September 15, 1941 the Japanese Minister learned that Panama was obliged to cooperate with the United States in the defense of the Canal and that, furthermore, it was duty bound to join the war in case the Canal were attacked. However, in case the United States entered the war, Panama was not obliged automatically to do likewise. The Japanese Minister pointed out that Japan need have no concern as to whether or not shipments to Panama, and from Panama to Japan, would be held up in the Canal Zone since the United States had promised that no shipments would be stopped.[743]

On September 20, 1941 the Japanese Minister to Panama learned that he was also accredited as Japanese Minister to Nicaragua.[744]

242. Minister Akiyama Estimates His Espionage and Propaganda Expenditures

After having made a special study of the attitude of the United States, of the nature of the Panamanian people, and of the topography of Panama, Mr. Akiyama, in a dispatch to Tokyo on September 20, 1941 made an estimate of the money needed for enlightenment, propaganda and intelligence purposes. With a forewarning that the expenditure summary would be "hard to take", he begged that these per month expenses be considered carefully.

The estimate included bonuses for officials or spies assigned to observe the movements of warships or give warning about other matters; running expenses for the Japanese broadcasting office; money for special spies; funds to pay those who tried to obtain information as well as those who achieved results; and a separate fund to maintain contact with newspaper reporters and other agents. In addition, he listed a special fund for spying in the other countries

[739] Facts on File, 1941, 354H.
[740] III, 494, 495.
[741] III, 494.
[742] Facts on File, 1941, 366-G.
[743] III, 496-497.
[744] III, 498.

[158]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

to which he was accredited. The total estimate amounted to an expenditure of $730.00 per month.[745]

243. Italian Maps of Panama Canal Shipped to Tokyo Via South America

Meanwhile, it was learned that the maps of the military fortifications at Panama were being delivered to Japan by devious methods. Having been taken to Chile by Minister Yamagata, the maps had been carried by Assistant Attache Usui from Chile to the Italian Ambassador in Buenos Aires, where the Assistant Attaches Kameda and Usui were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals. The maps had been then sent to Tokyo by a Japanese Naval Courier, Mr. Tatuma, who was returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru. The Japanese Minister in Argentina requested on September 23, 1941 that the Italian government be notified at the time of the arrival of these papers in Tokyo.[746]

244. Callao Merchants Forced to Secure Permits to Reship Japanese Goods to Panama Reporting that Callao shipping firms were reluctant to forward Japanese shipments,

Minister Akiyama informed Tokyo on September 30, 1941 that these firms had been told that they must first secure permits from the United States for all Japanese shipments to Panama. Japanese merchants had been unloading their merchandise at Callao, since the right of Japanese vessels to enter the port of Panama had been abolished.[747]

245. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Estimate of Number of Japanese Evacuees

Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired on October 4, 1941 as to the number of Japanese nationals living in Panama, and where these persons could best be transferred. In case commercial and industrial restrictions went into effect, some of the Japanese people would be able to shift for themselves, others could get along through cooperation, some could turn to agriculture, but others would have to go to other countries. Foreign Minister Toyoda was interested in the number of Japanese nationals who would have to be removed from Panama.[748]

Answering the Foreign Minister's dispatch on the same day that it was transmitted, Minister Akiyama replied that although negotiations were going on, the prospects were gloomy and many frightened persons would seize upon the present situation as an excuse to return to Japan. He promised to cable a more detailed answer promptly.[749]

246. Panamanian Official Denies Pressure by the United States

Mr. Akiyama reported on October 8, 1941 that a certain high Panamanian official, in answering an article which had been published in the official newspaper, La Tribune, said that the present step taken by the Panamanian government in regard to protecting its ships had not been made in cooperation with any country and especially not with a certain friendly neighboring country. According to the official, ships sailing under the Panamanian flag had been the object of repeated attacks and were compelled to adopt a firm attitude to protect the honor of the Panamanian flag.[750]

247. Minister Akiyama Inquires Concerning Japan's Acknowledgment of the New President and Cabinet

In a message to Tokyo on October 10, 1941 the Japanese Minister asked permission to acknowledge the new President of Panama in the name of Japan. According to a statement

[745] III, 499.
[747] III, 500.
[748] III, 501.
[748] III, 502.
[749] III, 503.
[750] III, 504.

[159]

made by a Panamanian official at the Foreign Office, there would be no formal inauguration ceremony for the President and the new Cabinet; instead, the departmental corps merely would be advised of this action. As to the policy of the new Cabinet, it was opposed to the Nationalist principles which had governed previous Cabinets and had issued a statement that it would place primary emphasis on democratic plans and personal freedom. Since it would, at the same time, work in close cooperation with the United States, the Foreign Minister believed that it was virtually a puppet in the hands of this government.[751]

[751] III, 505.

[160]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(c) Japanese-Philippine Relations

248. Japanese in Philippine Islands Request Passage to Japan

Mr. Katsumi Nihro, Consul to the Philippine Islands, reported to Tokyo on August 6, 1941 that approximately 1700 Japanese had requested accommodations to Japan. The unrest in the Philippines which had quieted down after the freezing order had been instituted, was now being revived since Japanese ships were gradually ceasing to come to the Philippines. Although the Consul was doing everything in his power to discourage the departure of Japanese nationals, he nevertheless advised that the Foreign Minister dispatch evacuation ships immediately to the Philippine Islands.

Of the evacuees, the greater part were women and children who would require third class accommodations. In case only one or two ships were available, it might be possible to ferry passengers between the Philippine Islands and Formosa. It was possible that American and French vessels could be used between Manila and Shanghai, but only a small portion of the Japanese nationals were able to purchase first and second class passage on these vessels. Because there were many in the Philippine Islands who "in their innermost hearts would like to return to Japan because of the present situation and the poor business conditions", and who had not yet applied for passage home, he felt that those who had applied should be dispatched as soon as possible.[752]

The Japanese Consul in Manila again reported on August 8, 1941 that in comparison to the Filipinos, Japanese who had come to Manila from outlying districts had, on the whole, maintained a calm which was astonishing to Americans and Filipinos alike. The Japanese women and children who had solemnly expressed their desire to be evacuated, felt that it was the responsibility of Japan to effect the evacuation even though it might cause inconvenience. The forbidding of Japanese passenger ships to enter the port of Manila had greatly increased the unrest. For this reason, the Japanese Consul asked that the Foreign Minister consider carefully this request.[753]

After learning of the suspension of overseas shipping by Japan on August 9, 1941 the Consul General continued to be very much concerned about the safety of the Japanese in the Philippine Islands in view of the inadequacies of the police system. Because of the possibility of war with the United States, he urged that ships be kept available for prompt evacuation.[754]

249. Consul Kihara Discusses Plight of Japanese Nationals with President Manuel Quezon

To present the problem of obtaining protection for Japanese residents in the event of war between the United States and Japan, the Japanese Consul to Manila, Mr. Jitaro Kihara, called on Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine government. When the Japanese Consul said that he would appreciate being advised of any plans which had been drawn up in this respect, President Quezon replied that Japanese residents might be forced to experience considerable hardships, depending upon the character of the person selected as the Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern forces. Although he had experienced many anxious moments concerning the situation, the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur had dispelled his worries, President Quezon said, for he felt that they could work together in harmony. He had not been able to get along with High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre.

[752] III, 506.
[753] III, 507.
[754] III, 508.

[161]

President Quezon pointed out, however, that if war did actually come, he and his Cabinet would be subordinated to the United States. In a recent conference with General MacArthur, he had stated that he was particularly interested in giving foreign residents every possible protection. President Quezon believed that it was quite possible that the United States would deem it necessary to place those persons in concentration camps. Jitaro Kihara then declared that as long as the Japanese nationals were not subjected to undue pressure, they would cause no trouble for they had been urged to remain calm and patient. Because of American propaganda and the anti-Japanese attitude of the general public, however, he could not guarantee that the Japanese residents would not take some measures to defend themselves, if war should break out.[755]

250. Consul Kihara Plans to Protect Japanese in Case of War

According to a tentative plan advanced by Consul Kihara, Japanese residents should be congregated in school, business and club buildings to facilitate their protection by the Philippine officers. President Quezon agreed with Mr. Kihara that such a plan would be mutually beneficial and added, that until the termination of the hypothetical war, or until the Japanese forces took the area over, there was need to store about six months supply of food for these people. President Quezon said that he would again confer with General MacArthur on this subject.[756]

251. Consul Nihro Reports Trend Toward Philippine Independence

In an intelligence dispatch sent on August 6, 1941 the Japanese Consul reported that the question of Philippine independence had been raised again in the American Congress. In spite of the fact that General Aquinaldo had openly supported the proposal, the American government and influential politicians in the Philippine Islands had not commented on it.[757]

The Philippine government and Congress had already approved the policy of granting Philippine independence in 1946, and according to a newspaper comment, political independence was already a "closed" question. By the time actual independence had been reached, it was felt that conditions would somehow have adjusted themselves in spite of the critical conditions in the Far East.

The Consul felt assured of the coming of Philippine independence in spite of Mr. Paul V. McNutt's opposition to it in his speech of July 7, 1941. In addition, a United States Congressman had said that Mr. Elisalde, a Philippine official in the United States, had been in favor of a resurvey of the movement for Philippine independence and that this movement was gradually becoming stronger in the United States Congress and in the American government. It was possible that this question would be reviewed in the American-Philippine conference, scheduled to be held in 1944, which was stipulated by the Tydings-McDuffie Act. For this reason, the Japanese Consul felt that it was necessary in the future to pay full attention to the attitude of the United States.[758]

252. Filipinos Predict Japanese Occupation of Thailand

On August 7, 1941 an intelligence report of the Philippine reaction to the occupation of French Indo-China was made to Tokyo. In general, Consul Nihro said, the people took it for granted that the Japanese occupation of Thailand could not be prevented. This move, the Filipinos felt, would probably take place after about two months, since that amount of time would be required for Japan to solidify her occupation of French Indo-China.

[755] III, 509
[756] Ibid.
[757] III, 510.
[758] Ibid.

[162]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Although people were watching the British military fortifications and construction work in the Far East and though much was being made of Britain's stiffened policy, it was generally believed in the Philippines that the attitude of the United States was not strong. For the substantiation of this belief, the people pointed to the speedy settlement of the Tutuila incident. Local newspapermen in the Philippines believed that war between Japan and the United States was a possibility but that it could be avoided if the French Indo-China and Thailand incidents were settled by an agreement.[759]

253. Consul Nihro Suggests Japanese Propaganda Against American Business Methods

According to Consul Nihro, many unfortunate problems were arising in regard to goods purchased in the Philippine Islands, and important people were gradually being aroused. In case licenses for iron ore were denied and Japanese ships detained, Japanese officials could use such action in their propaganda to convince the Filipinos that the United States had caused Japan to stop business dealings with them. This would anger the Filipinos and would harm the United States.

On the other hand, if Japan obtained permits, ships must be made available to transport the materials. In this event, the yearly amount of Japanese exports would total 900,000 tons, which could be brought in by monthly installments.[760] In the matter of the purchase of hemp, although permits were being withheld at the present time, the Japanese Consul believed that Japan could eventually procure as much of it as America did not consume.

As to the purchase of molasses, it was doubted that the United States would include this product among quota goods since Japan had been the chief molasses consumer. Considering the fact that there was an annual exportable amount of 50,000 tons of molasses, Japan could continue its purchases for the time being. The Japanese Consul suggested, however, that these dealings take place as inconspicuously as possible.[761]

254. Consul Nihro Requests Continuance of Japanese Shipping

That Japan endeavor by every means possible to maintain trade with the Philippine Islands was suggested by Consul Nihro in a summary of the Japanese-Philippine trade situation on August 12, 1941. If the lack of Japanese shipping to Manila and Davao persisted, the Philippines might become antipathetic so that if Japan wished to resume its purchase of such items as iron ore, it would be unable to do so. For this reason, Consul Nihro urged that ships should be dispatched immediately to the Philippine Islands to get the iron ore and other quota goods, and at the same time permits should be procured to bring in a corresponding amount of Japanese goods.[762]

255. Consul Nihro Urges Protection of Japanese Trade

That American ships plying between Japan and the Philippine Islands be exempt from the application of trade restrictions was suggested to Tokyo by Consul Nihro on August 12, 1941. Not only did the regulations apply to Japanese companies making their headquarters in the Philippine Islands, but also to foreign companies with offices in Japan. Therefore, in order that all trade between these two points not be discontinued entirely, he felt that the American companies should be exempted.[763]

Emphasizing the fact that it might become necessary for all trade between Japan and the Philippine Islands to be shut off, the Japanese Consul pointed out that in spite of the regu-

[759] III, 511.
[760] III, 512.
[761] Ibid.
[762] Ibid.
[763] III, 513.

[163]

lations for the freezing of funds, comprehensive permits were yet obtainable. He disapproved any plan for stopping the export of Japanese goods, since it would result only in the closing down of approximately 600 Japanese retail companies in the Islands. Furthermore, since the textile industry looked to Japan for raw materials, any order calling for the stoppage of this supply would endanger the existence of many Japanese factories.

Other factors which he felt should be considered in any decision in this matter were: "there was little danger that Japanese ships would be seized; the stoppage of Philippine export quota goods would have a bad effect on the attitude of the Filipinos toward Japan; permits could still be secured for the exporting of iron ore and hemp; and Japan was only a few days distant by sea from the Philippine Islands".[764]

256. Consul Nihro Request Permits Be Granted to Receive Funds in Japan

Another suggestion forthcoming from Japanese Consul Nihro on August 12, 1941 was that the requiring of permits for relatives in Japan to receive money from Japanese residents in the Philippines be abolished. It was possible for Japanese nationals to secure permits to send between 200 and 400 pesos to their families in Japan, but since persons in Japan receiving these drafts must first secure permits to receive the money, the Japanese in the Islands were afraid that their families would be unable to obtain the necessary permits.[765]

257. Consul Nihro Plans to Agitate Against the United States

Consul Kihara was advised by two confidential sources on August 8 and 10, 1941 that the time was ripe for agitation in the Philippines against the "landlords". Following out previous instructions which had been sent by Tokyo, Mr. Kihara had made arrangements to begin the agitation. Consul Nihro declared that in view of the current changes in the Philippine government and the great concern which was felt in the Philippines over the international situation, Japan should now take a firm position.[766]

258. Foreign Minister Toyoda Restrains Consul Nihro from Disturbing the Diplomatic Situation

On August 15, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Consul Nihro to drop all plans to make the Filipinos antagonistic towards the United States. The Japanese Consul was told to endeavor to maintain the status quo until such time as a solution could be reached on the main problem.[767]

259. Japanese Plan Broadcast to the Philippines Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

On the occasion of President Quezon's birthday a discussion of Japanese-Philippine relations was to be the subject of a radio address in Spanish by General Rikarute, a political refugee residing in Japan. Consul Nihro was directed to make arrangements for publicizing the 10 minute broadcast, which was to be heard at 10:50 P.M. on August 19, 1941.[768]

260. Japanese Businessmen Return to Japan

In reassuring Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 16, 1941 that there was little need for concern in regard to Mr. Nagao and Mr. Uyeno, members of the "Kinyo Kai", a Japanese association, Consul Nihro said that both would return to Japan aboard the French Steamship Marshal Joffre, sailing on August 18, 1941. They were returning home, partly for the purpose

[764] III, 514.
[765] III, 515.
[766] III, 516.
[767] III, 517.
[768] III, 518.

164

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

of making a report, and would leave again when the political situation had become more stable and future prospects more certain. Many Japanese businessmen had already returned to Japan, the Consul reported, since it had become impossible for them to engage in their work.[769]

261. Japanese Consul Requests Housing Facilities in Shanghai for Japanese Evacuees

On August 19, 1941 the Japanese Consul in Manila requested temporary housing in Shanghai for transient Japanese enroute from Manila to Japan. Owing to recent developments in international relations and the resulting unrest, as many as 370 Japanese had applied for passage on the French steamer, Marshal Joffre. Since approximately 200 of these had no connections in Shanghai, Japanese groups in Shanghai were asked to provide lodging facilities for these passengers in primary schools and other buildings. Furthermore, it was requested that staterooms be reserved on ships sailing from Shanghai to Japan.[770]

262. State Department Official Discusses American Policies

In reporting a conversation between Mr. L. E. Salisbury, State Department aide to the High Commissioner, and a Japanese official in Manila, Consul Nihro advised Tokyo on August 21, 1941 that America seemed to have no intention of altering its policy toward the Orient. According to the Japanese Consul, America's attitude as expressed by Mr. Salisbury conveyed the impression that there was nothing to do but await the impoverishment of Japan which was expending all its strength in French Indo-China and Thailand. Since America's objective was the destruction of "Nazism", it was necessary to extend aid to Russia. However, after the overthrow of Germany there would immediately be a change in American-Russian relations.

The Japanese official learned from Mr. Salisbury that there was great dissatisfaction in the United States regarding the aid to Russia program, but in the Philippines attention was focused on the steps Japan would take in regard to American shipment of materials to Russia.[771]

263. Ambassador Nomura Encounters Difficulty in Handling Japanese-Philippine Problems

On August 22, 1941 Ambassador Nomura in Washington notified the Japanese Minister in Manila that at present Japanese-American relations were being handled as political problems, which was not a simple procedure. He requested, therefore, that the matter be taken care of in Manila as the Japanese Minister thought best. In the present situation, Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to negotiate for such things as Filipino cotton goods agreements even though this matter was handled by leading American businessmen.[772]

264. American Officials Apply Freezing Regulations Leniently

Extreme leniency in the application of the freezing order in the Philippine Islands was reported by Consul Nihro to Tokyo on August 22, 1941. Although the authorities had demanded that the banks submit statements of balance as of August 11, 1941, they had evinced interest only in business amounting to more than 2,000 pesos. Furthermore, they had been extremely cautious in the investigation, fearing that they might interfere with the banking business. Frozen accounts of small amounts had been ignored, though particular attention had been paid to banking businesses in which 5,000 or more pesos were involved.

Even in case of frozen funds the authorities had permitted the issuance of comprehensive licenses for remittances necessary for paying family expenses. Leniency had been shown in classifying Japanese nationals, and the practice of carrying on trade without remittances or

[769] III, 519.
[770] III, 520.
[771] III, 521.
[772] III, 522.